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Public Interest over Private Prejudice?
THE PUBLIC INTEREST EXCEPTION TO THE
DEFENSE OF LACHES AND THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S
CLEAN SLATE
INTRODUCTION
On September 10, 1992, a group led by Cheyenne and
Muscogee Native American activist Suzan Shown Harjo1 filed a
petition with the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) to
cancel six trademark registrations owned by Pro-Football, Inc.,
the owner of the Washington Redskins professional football
team, on the grounds that the trademarks were disparaging to
Native Americans.2 The 1994 Harjo v. Pro Football trademark
cancellation proceeding marked the beginning of a more than
20-year journey for Native American activists that continues
even today.3 Despite tremendous public support for the petitioners’
position in Harjo and the TTAB’s initial ruling in their favor, 20
years of appeals and hearings ensued, including various equitable
claims and defenses raised by Pro-Football.4 Included among these
claims and defenses was Pro-Football’s assertion of the equitable
1 Hunter Walker, Meet the Native American Grandmother Who Just Beat the
Washington Redskins, BUS. INSIDER (June 18, 2014, 12:41 PM), http://www.businessinsider.
com/meet-the-native-american-grandmother-who-just-beat-the-redskins-2014-6 [http://
perma.cc/KA4N-3QBS].
2 Harjo v. Pro Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1828, 1994 WL 262249 (T.T.A.B.
1994); Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Inquiry System: Cancellation, U.S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF., http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/v?pno=92021069&pty=CAN [http://
perma.cc/VB5Z-ZTPX] (last visited Apr. 29, 2016).
3 See, e.g., Pro Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 565 F.3d 880 (D.C. Cir. 2009); ProFootball, Inc. v. Harjo, 567 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2008); Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo,
284 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2003); Blackhorse v. Pro Football, Inc., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d 1633,
2011 WL 1886402 (T.T.A.B. 2011); Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705,
1999 WL 375907 (T.T.A.B. 1999); Harjo, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1828.
4 See, e.g., Pro Football, 565 F.3d 880 (affirming the district court’s decision
that Pro-Football’s lost value of investments in its various trademarks was sufficient
evidence of prejudice for the purposes of establishing a defense of laches); Pro-Football,
567 F. Supp. 2d 46 (granting summary judgment for Pro-Football, holding that Harjo’s
delay in bringing the action was undue and led to economic prejudice); Blackhorse v. ProFootball, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1080, 2014 WL 2757516 (T.T.A.B. 2014) (holding that
Blackhorse successfully proved that a substantial composite of Native Americans found
the term “Redskins” to be disparaging); Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705 (holding for Harjo in
finding Pro-Football’s marks may disparage Native Americans).
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defense of laches; it argued that the petitioners unreasonably
delayed in bringing the suit, resulting in undue prejudice to
Pro-Football.5 Ultimately, the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit reaffirmed the TTAB’s ruling in favor of Pro-Football,6
holding that Pro-Football’s equitable defense of laches must be
upheld even in the face of its disparaging trademark.7
Viewed by the Native American petitioners as a victory
by mere technicality,8 the D.C. Circuit’s 2009 decision marked
the end of Harjo’s petition, but it also sparked public debate on
the topic and inspired a new petition against Pro-Football’s
controversial Redskins trademark registrations.9 Over the past
decade, the general public has become increasingly aware of the
legal battle against the Washington Redskins that has transcended
the realm of sports and reached the court of public opinion, the
forefront of politicians’ and civil rights groups’ agendas, and
even the scathing plot of a popular animated television show.10
Those who oppose the Washington Redskins’ trademark
registrations contend that Pro-Football’s “mockery and racism”
belong in the past.11 President Barack Obama has echoed this
sentiment, suggesting, “If I were the owner of the team and I
knew that there was a name of my team—even if it had a
storied history—that was offending a sizeable group of people,
I’d think about changing it.”12 In a targeted attack, former U.S.
Representative Eni Faleomavaega introduced a bill in the
Pro Football, 565 F.3d 880.
See id. at 886.
7 Id.
8 Walker, supra note 1.
9 See id. See generally Blackhorse v. Pro Football, Inc., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d 1633,
2011 WL 1886402 (T.T.A.B. 2011) (discussing the Blackhorse cancellation proceeding
and some of the issues discussed between the parties at the pretrial conference).
10 See, e.g., Erik Brady, 50 Senators Sign Letter Urging Redskins to Change
Team Name, USA TODAY (May 22, 2014, 1:12 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
sports/nfl/redskins/2014/05/22/washington-redskins-senate-nickname-american-indians
-daniel-snyder/9439613/ [http://perma.cc/76RX-ZTJV]; Justin Moyer, ‘South Park’s’ Epic
Satire of Dan Snyder, the Washington Redskins, Roger Goodell and the NFL, WASH. POST
(Sept. 25, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/09/25/so
uth-parks-epic-satire-on-dan-snyder-roger-goodell-and-the-nfl/ [http://perma.cc/VK5QA8W7]; Theresa Vargas & Annys Shin, President Obama Says, ‘I’d Think About
Changing’ Name of Washington Redskins, WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2013), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/local/president-obama-says-id-think-about-changing-name-of
-washington-redskins/2013/10/05/e170b914-2b70-11e3-8ade-a1f23cda135e_story.html
[http://perma.cc/P34B-7XDG]; South Park: Go Fund Yourself (Comedy Central
television broadcast Sept. 24, 2014). In Go Fund Yourself, the children of South Park
band together and decide to use the “Redskins” name for their own start-up company
after learning that the Washington Redskins had lost its trademark. South Park: Go
Fund Yourself, supra.
11 Larry Atkins, It’s Time to Scalp the Washington Redskins’ Nickname,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 5, 2013, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/larryatkins/its-time-to-scalp-the-was_b_3377760.html [http://perma.cc/R3QQ-VQXM].
12 Vargas & Shin, supra note 10 (quoting President Obama).
5
6
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House of Representatives in 2013 to amend the Trademark Act
of 1946 to effectively eliminate trademark rights for any marks
containing the term “redskin.”13 But not everyone was
offended—a 2004 survey found that about 90% of the 768
Native Americans surveyed in the contiguous United States found
the football team name “Redskins” acceptable, while only 9% found
the team name to be offensive.14
On August 15, 2006, amidst the Harjo proceedings,
Navajo Native American Amanda Blackhorse and four others
filed a petition that mirrored Harjo’s 1994 disparagement
claims.15 Yet the TTAB again held for the petitioners, ruling
that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) must
cancel Pro-Football’s challenged trademark registrations.16
Between the time of filing of the Blackhorse petition and
the TTAB’s decision, the passage of the 2011 Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act (AIA) changed the venue of appeals from
the TTAB to allow appellants to appeal to the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, as opposed to the
D.C. Circuit as originally established in the Trademark Act of
1964.17 This change in venue has significant procedural
implications and provides a unique opportunity for the Blackhorse
dispute to set precedent in a new jurisdiction and ensure that the
equitable defense of laches is recognized as a proper defense in
trademark cancellation petitions for disparagement, even in
the face of a public interest exception.18 Although the district
and circuit courts reversed the TTAB’s holding in Harjo’s
petition against Pro-Football’s registrations,19 Blackhorse’s appeal
to the Eastern District of Virginia, based on essentially the same
circumstances, led to the opposite result when the district court
affirmed the TTAB’s cancellation of Pro-Football’s registrations,
13 Non-Disparagement of Native American Persons or Peoples in Trademark
Registration Act of 2013, H.R. 1278, 113th Cong. (2013).
14 Press Release, The Annenberg Pub. Policy Ctr. of the Univ. of Pa., Most
Indians Say Name of Washington “Redskins” Is Acceptable While 9 Percent Call It
Offensive (Sept. 24, 2004).
15 Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1080, 2014 WL 2757516
(T.T.A.B. 2014); Petition, Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., Cancellation No. 92046185
(Aug. 11, 2006).
16 Blackhorse, 111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1080, 2014 WL 2757516, at *33-34.
17 Lanham Act § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(4) (2012); Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act, Pub L. No. 112-29, § 9, 125 Stat. 284, 316 (2011).
18 Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 137 (D.D.C. 2003); see
Jeremy Byellin, Will “Redskins” Trademark Ruling Be Reversed Like the Last One?,
THOMSON REUTERS LEGAL SOLUTIONS BLOG (June 25, 2014), http://blog.legalsolutions.
thomsonreuters.com/top-legal-news/will-redskins-trademark-ruling-reversed-like-lastone/ [http://perma.cc/ZZ8Z-U3VM] (discussing the impact of the AIA venue change on
the TTAB’s decision in Blackhorse v. Pro-Football).
19 Pro Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 565 F.3d 880, 886 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Pro-Football,
Inc. v. Harjo, 567 F. Supp. 2d 46, 62 (D.D.C. 2008); Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 145.
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disallowing the laches defense that was crucially successful in
Harjo.20 As the proceeding leaves the Eastern District of Virginia
on appeal, the Fourth Circuit should maintain the laches defense
in trademark cancellation appeals based on disparagement
challenges. Disregarding the Harjo court’s affirmation of the
laches defense in favor of a fickle public interest exception has
the concerning potential to devalue the benefits and purposes
of trademark ownership and allow offended factions free reign
to challenge trademarks with decades of established goodwill.
This note argues that the Fourth Circuit should set the
precedent for appeals under the new AIA procedure and hold
that the laches defense is applicable against trademark
cancellation claims of disparagement brought under section
2(a) of the Lanham Act, even in instances of a purportedly greater
public interest. Part I of this note provides a background on
pertinent aspects of trademark law and procedure in the context
of the TTAB, the doctrine of laches as an equitable defense to
trademark cancellation claims, and the public interest
exception as it relates to the equitable defense of laches. Part II
discusses the impact of the AIA’s change in venue for appeals
of TTAB decisions from the D.C. Circuit to the Fourth Circuit
and how the Fourth Circuit should treat the defense of laches
to trademark cancellation challenges. Part III argues that the
laches defense should be upheld in the face of the public interest
exception raised by petitioners asserting disparagement claims.
The note concludes with a broader perspective on how the
Fourth Circuit’s decision in Blackhorse may impact other
potentially related trademark challenges in and outside of the
realm of sports.
I.

BACKGROUND AND RELEVANT LAW

A.

Overview of Trademark Law and the Lanham Act

In order to fully appreciate the significance of the Harjo
and Blackhorse decisions, it is important to understand basic
trademark law and the statutes governing any petitioner’s
challenge to a purportedly disparaging trademark, as well as
any corresponding procedural implications. The Trademark Act of
1946, housed in Title 15 of the U.S. Code and more commonly

20

Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 447-48 (E.D. Va. 2015).
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known as the “Lanham Act,” is the statute that governs the filing
of a petition for the cancellation of a trademark.21
The Lanham Act was ratified in 1946 in response to
federal trademark statutes in place since 1870 that were
“largely ineffective and had limited success.”22 For instance, the
first federal trademark statute was deemed unconstitutional in
the famous Trade-Mark Cases, as it wrongly attributed
Congress’s power to regulate trademarks to the Intellectual
Property Clause in the Constitution.23 Following the Trade-Mark
Cases, the federal statute passed in 1881 limited federal protection
of trademarks used in commerce with foreign nations and Indian
tribes, while the 1920 Act contained language too restrictive for
litigants to utilize effectively.24 While there has always been
recognition of a right to protect marks that distinguish an
individual’s goods or services at common law, with compensation
available for infringement of this right,25 the Lanham Act’s
passage was important in that it established a consistent
“national system of trademark registration.”26 This uniformity
was particularly important to the development of trademark law
because prior to the Lanham Act’s passage, differing state laws
largely governed the protection of trademarks.27
Although courts recognize common law rights that
protect trademarks, registration of a trademark through the
Lanham Act has significant procedural advantages.28 Courts
recognize common law rights of “‘priority of appropriation’ and
commercial use of the mark,” but federal registration under the
Lanham Act offers various benefits, such as federal jurisdiction
and prima facie evidence of validity and ownership of the
trademark.29 Additionally, the Lanham Act provides a variety
21 Lanham Act §§ 1, 14. The Trademark Act of 1946 was given the nickname
the “Lanham Act” because of Congressman Fritz Garland Lanham’s instrumental
leadership, starting with his introduction of the bill in 1938, through the numerous
hearings, up to President Truman’s signing of the bill on July 5, 1946. 1 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5:4 (4th ed.
2015). The most important sections of this expansive statute, for the purposes of
understanding trademark cancellation proceedings based on disparagement claims,
include sections 2, 14, and 21 of the Lanham Act.
22 Lanham Act §§ 1-74 (originally enacted as Trademark Act of 1946); Ethan
Horwitz & Benjamin Levi, Fifty Years of the Lanham Act: A Retrospective of Section
43(a), 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 59, 60-61 (1996).
23 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 86, 99 (1879) (citing U.S. CONST. art. VIII, § 8).
24 Horwitz & Levi, supra note 22, at 60-62.
25 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 92.
26 Lanham Act, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); Dawn Phleger, The
Lanham Act’s Contribution to Trademark Rights, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 141,
142 (2001).
27 Horwitz & Levi, supra note 22, at 60-61.
28 Phleger, supra note 26, at 142.
29 Id. at 141 (quoting Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82).
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of other advantages, including the right to nationwide exclusivity
for use of the mark in commerce, availability of special statutory
remedies for infringement, and the right to register with the
Treasury Department to work with U.S. Customs to prevent
potentially infringing imports.30 In order to take advantage of
these benefits, an individual must first register a trademark on
the USPTO’s Principal Register.31 Unless otherwise indicated, all
marks are registered on the Principal Register, granting
registrants a number of procedural advantages.32 According to
section 1 of the Lanham Act, a trademark application must include
the date of first use of the mark and specify the goods in connection
with the mark.33
Arguably the two most important rationales for federal
trademark registration involve property investment and
consumer protection.34 Furthermore, a Senate Report submitted
during the push to enact the legislation indicated that the
Lanham Act has two distinct purposes:
One is to protect the public so it may be confident that, in
purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark which it
favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for and wants
to get. Secondly, where the owner of a trade-mark has spent energy,
time, and money in presenting to the public the product, he is
protected in his investment from its misappropriation by pirates and
cheats. This is the well-established rule of law protecting both the
public and the trademark owner.35

Although dissimilar from many other civil law systems,
American trademark law recognizes a trademark as property,
but only insofar as it helps to advance consumer protection.36
The economic incentive of investing in trademarks in order to
build consumer goodwill carries with it certain Lanham Act
protections.37 Thus, the underlying trademark law rationales
of property investment and consumer protection appear to
work synergistically.38
While the range of possible marks registrable under the
Lanham Act appears to be quite broad at first glance, the
Id.
Lanham Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012).
32 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 19:9. Some of the procedural advantages
include federal jurisdiction for infringement without a required amount in controversy,
damages recoverable in federal court, and prima facie evidence of the mark’s validity. Id.
33 Lanham Act § 1.
34 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 2:1.
35 S. REP. NO. 1333, at 3 (1946).
36 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 2:14.
37 Id. § 2:3.
38 Id. § 2:1.
30
31
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Lanham Act explicitly outlines what qualifies as a trademark
and restricts what the USPTO will allow on the Principal
Register.39 Moreover, a trademark is a source identifier and helps
to ensure consistency in quality control.40 The Lanham Act broadly
defines a trademark as
any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof (1) used
by a person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in
commerce . . . to identify and distinguish his or her goods . . . from those
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods
even if that source is unknown.41

Although the spectrum of available trademarks is broad, as
U.S. trademark law recognizes a wide array of “symbols” and
“devices,”42 both the USPTO and individuals can challenge the
validity of a mark through available Lanham Act procedures.
B.

Restrictions on Trademark Registration

Section 2 of the Lanham Act lists what the USPTO will
allow on the Principal Register.43 In order to qualify for
registration on the Principal Register, “[t]he trademark or service
mark cannot fall within one of the statutory bars of Lanham Act
§ 2.”44 Two of section 2’s most relevant restrictions include section
2(a)’s bar on immoral, deceptive, slanderous, or disparaging
marks45 and 2(d)’s bar on marks that may lead to consumer
confusion, mistake, or deception.46 Particularly significant for 2(a)
claims of disparagement, “[i]f a statutory bar of § 2 is raised by
one who . . . petitions for cancellation of a registration, the
burden of proof is on that person.”47
Lanham Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2012).
74 AM. JUR. 2D Trademarks and Tradenames § 1 (2016).
41 Id.
42 The USPTO has permitted the registration of the famous NBC Chimes, the
Pillsbury Doughboy giggle, and even the color red on the soles of shoes designed by
high-fashion shoe designer Christian Louboutin. See, e.g., Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent
Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 211 (2d Cir. 2012); Trademark “Sound Mark” Examples,
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/trademark/soundmarks/trademarksound-mark-examples [http://perma.cc/7983-27ML] (last visited Apr. 26, 2016).
43 Lanham Act § 2.
44 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 19:10.
45 Lanham Act § 2(a).
46 Id. § 2(d).
47 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 19:75. Although sections 2(b) and 2(c) are
statutory bars of equal weight, they are not as relevant as sections 2(a) and 2(d) for the
purposes of this note. This is due to the fact that sections 2(b) and 2(c) bar marks that
consist of U.S. insignia and unapproved identifying indicia of a living person,
respectively—two statutory hurdles that are not germane to issues of the laches defense
and public interest within the Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc. and Blackhorse v. Pro-Football
proceedings. Id.
39

40
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1. Statutory Bar Against Trademarks That Lead to
Consumer Confusion: Section 2(d)
The statutory bar on marks that may cause consumer
confusion is raised much more frequently than section 2(a)
disparagement claims.48 This trend is the same for both oppositions
and cancellation proceedings.49 Thus, the first of the two relevant
restrictions on registrable trademarks for the purposes of this note
is described in section 2(d).50 More generally, section 2(d)
represents the most common basis for rejection of all section 2
statutory bars within the Lanham Act.51 The challenger commonly
argues that either the mark at issue is confusingly similar to the
registered mark or that the mark at issue, sometimes called a
“prior common-law mark,” is confusingly similar to a trademark
that has been developed by use (rather than statutorily).52
The TTAB’s modern test for determining the likelihood
of confusion of a mark is whether the public would likely
“mistakenly assume” that the trademark at issue originated
from or is associated with goods sold under a trademark already
on the Principal Register.53 Moreover, “likelihood of confusion
encompasses confusion of sponsorship, affiliation or connection.”54
While there are a number of factors that can be weighed to
determine the likelihood of consumer confusion, since it is a
question of fact,55 “[t]he similarity or dissimilarity of the marks
in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and
commercial impression” may be dispositive.56 Where the risk of
consumer confusion is high, the “public interest” is of the
utmost concern.57 At the most basic level, the petitioner claiming
likelihood of confusion of a mark must first show that it used the
mark in commerce prior to the allegedly infringing user, thus
establishing priority of use.58 But a petitioner’s claims based on
section 2(d)’s bar on marks likely to cause confusion is not
48 See Steven R. Latterell, Stopping the “Savage Indian” Myth: Dealing with
the Doctrine of Laches in Lanham Act Claims of Disparagement, 80 IND. L.J. 1141,
1151 (2005).
49 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 20:53.
50 Lanham Act § 2(d).
51 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 19:75.
52 3 id. § 20:14.
53 FBI v. Societe: “M. Bril & Co.,” 172 U.S.P.Q. 310, 1971 WL 16592, at *7
(T.T.A.B. 1971).
54 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 23:78 (quoting Hilson Research, Inc. v. Soc’y
for Human Res. Mgmt., 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1423, 1993 WL 290669 (T.T.A.B. 1993)).
55 In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
56 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 23:79.
57 Ultra-White Co. v. Johnson Chem. Indus., 465 F.2d 891, 893-94 (C.C.P.A.
1972).
58 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 16:1.50.
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without limits.59 In particular, if the challenged mark has been
registered for more than five years, section 2(d) challenges are
barred.60 Challenges based on section 2(d) target the very harms
trademark law is intended to protect—economic harm to
consumers. In this way, the rationale for the public interest
exception to a laches defense applies neatly to this statutory bar.
2. Statutory Bar Against Disparaging Trademarks:
Section 2(a)
Another restriction on registrable trademarks is in section
2(a) of the Lanham Act,61 which provides that trademarks deemed
“immoral, deceptive, or scandalous . . . or matter which may
disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons . . . or
bring them into contempt[ ] or disrepute” will be refused
registration on the Principal Register.62 Legislative history fails to
explain section 2(a)’s purpose, which is especially curious given
the existence of anti-obscenity laws.63 Two commonly suggested
rationales for the section 2(a) bar are the “waste of government
resources theory,” which states that immoral, scandalous, or
disparaging marks unduly waste the federal government’s
resources, and the “implied imprimatur” theory, which claims
that the government has an interest in dispelling the notion that
it impliedly accepts such immoral trademarks.64
Perhaps due to the underlying morality considerations,
scholars have found it difficult to square courts’ often inconsistent
and subjective analyses of section 2(a).65 For example, a judge
may deem a mark scandalous or immoral based on largely
unpredictable factors, such as political views or societal
influences.66 As summarized by one academic, “[a] Section 2(a)
Lanham Act § 14(3), 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2012).
Otto Int’l, Inc. v. Otto Kern GMBH, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1861, 2007 WL
1577524, at *2 (T.T.A.B. 2007).
61 Lanham Act § 2(a).
62 Id. This note will focus largely on the implications on persons or entities of
what will be referred to as “disparagement claims” or “2(a) claims” and will not delve
into the second half of section 2(a), which discusses geographical indications. Id.
63 Jendi B. Reiter, Redskins and Scarlet Letters: Why “Immoral” and
“Scandalous” Trademarks Should Be Federally Registrable, 6 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 191,
192 (1996).
64 In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 486 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Bruce C. Kelber,
“Scalping the Redskins:” Can Trademark Law Start Athletic Teams Bearing Native
American Nicknames and Images on the Road to Racial Reform?, 17 HAMLINE L. REV.
533, 560 (1994).
65 Reiter, supra note 63, at 193.
66 See In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216, 1993 WL 114384,
at *5-6 (T.T.A.B. 1993) (holding that, based on the seriousness of the AIDS epidemic
and its significance in the United States as a major social issue, the patriotic decoration
of condoms cannot be deemed scandalous for purposes of a section 2(a) claim).
59

60
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proceeding . . . decision is made by judges and administrative
agencies on a national level, and a minority of hypothetically
offended people can override community standards of taste.”67
Section 2(a) was particularly important in the Harjo proceedings
and remains a crucial part of the Blackhorse dispute currently
being litigated.68 But in comparison to section 2(d) likelihood of
confusion claims, case law involving section 2(a) claims is less
developed, especially in cases of disparagement of a racial or
ethnic group.69 Furthermore, the TTAB noted in Harjo the
limited legislative history discussing the meaning of the term
“disparaging,” so it looked to the “ordinary and common meaning”
of the term.70
Adding to the confusion, the various grounds within
section 2(a) (i.e., immoral, scandalous, and disparaging) often
overlap.71 Claims for disparagement, however, are considered a
“separate and distinct ground” in their ability to form an
independent trademark cancellation challenge.72 The Harjo court
developed a two-prong test for determining whether a trademark
is disparaging for the purposes of cancellation via a section 2(a)
claim.73 First, the court should determine the meaning of the
matter in question and, second, in view of the meaning, the
court should decide whether the meaning may be disparaging
to the referenced group.74 In addition, these two questions must
“be answered as of the dates of registration of the marks herein.”75
This was an important rule in the context of the Harjo
proceedings, as one of Pro-Football’s challenged registrations was
registered with the USPTO in 1967, and thus the court had to
inquire into the disparaging nature of a mark almost five decades
old.76 Dissenting TTAB Administrative Trademark Judge Marc
Bergsman in the Blackhorse hearing highlighted the importance
of capturing the disparaging nature of a mark at the time it was
registered when he declared that “this case is not about the
Reiter, supra note 63, at 195.
Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 567 F. Supp. 2d 46, 49 (D.D.C. 2008);
Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1080, 2014 WL 2757516, at *1
(T.T.A.B. 2014); Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705, 1999 WL 375907, at
*2-4 (T.T.A.B. 1998).
69 See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 19:77:25; Latterell, supra note 48, at 1151.
70 Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705, 1999 WL 375907, at *35.
71 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 19:77:25.
72 Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705, 1999 WL 375907, at *35; 3 MCCARTHY, supra
note 21, § 19:77:25.
73 Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705, 1999 WL 375907, at *38.
74 Id. at *35-38.
75 Id. at *38.
76 Harjo v. Pro Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1828, 1994 WL 262249 (T.T.A.B.
1994).
67
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controversy, currently playing out in the media, over whether the
term ‘redskins,’ as the name of Washington’s professional football
team, is disparaging to Native Americans today.”77
In determining the “meaning of the matter in question,”
a court or board may consider dictionary definitions, the nature
of the goods or services that the mark represents, as well as how
the mark is used in the marketplace.78 Dictionary definitions,
while useful in capturing the essence of a term at a specific point
in time, may also be subject to liberal interpretation. As Judge
Bergsman suggested in his dissenting opinion, while “Redskins” is
defined in a 1967 dictionary as “often offensive,” the term is not
always offensive in every context (e.g., “when used in connection
with the name of a football team”).79 To prove whether the mark
actually disparages, a petitioner may provide “evidence regarding
the views of the relevant group, the connotations of the subject
matter in question, the relationship between that matter and the
other elements that make up the marks, and the manner in
which the marks appear and are used in the marketplace.”80
C.

Notable Procedural Considerations in Cancellation
Petitions

In addition to illustrating which trademarks are
registrable and the corresponding statutory restrictions, the
Lanham Act also explains the specific set of procedural measures
that must be followed in an inter partes trademark cancellation
proceeding.81 Section 14 stipulates that any person may file a
cancellation proceeding “who believes that he is or will be
damaged . . . by the registration of a mark on the principal
register.”82 In order to succeed in a section 14 proceeding, a
petitioner must prove that he or she is likely to be damaged by
the registration and that the petitioner has a valid argument
as to why the registration should be cancelled.83 The
77 Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1080, 2014 WL 2757516,
at *35 (T.T.A.B. 2014) (Bergsman, A.L.J., dissenting).
78 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 19:77:25 (citing In re Lebanese Arak Corp.,
94 U.S.P.Q.2d 1215, 2010 WL 766488 (T.T.A.B. 2010)).
79 Blackhorse, 111 U.S.P.Q.2d, 2014 WL 2757516, at *37 (Bergsman, A.L.J.,
dissenting) (quoting RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (1st ed. 1966)).
80 Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705, 1999 WL 375907, at *41.
81 Lanham Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (2012). Inter partes disputes are those
disputes involving two or more parties. Inter Partes, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th
ed. 2014). Comparatively, ex parte disputes are disputes “for the benefit of one party
only, and without notice to, or argument by, anyone having an adverse interest”—in
the case of a trademark dispute, the trademark petitioner. Ex Parte, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
82 Lanham Act § 14.
83 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 20:41.
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administrative body that hears cancellation petitions is the
TTAB, but the USPTO does not have exclusive jurisdiction over
registration decisions. Federal courts maintain concurrent
jurisdiction and have the power to cancel a registration, but only
if a case has independent grounds for federal jurisdiction (e.g.,
diversity of citizenship).84 Although section 37 appears to grant
federal jurisdiction “[i]n any action involving a registered mark,”
this section only describes federal courts’ ability to create a
remedy (e.g., a cancellation order).85 Moreover, providing federal
courts with jurisdiction over any cancellation claim would permit
litigants to circumvent the USPTO entirely.86
Unlike a petition for cancellation based on section 2(d)
claims for likelihood of confusion, “a petition for cancellation
based on § 2(a) [for disparagement] is permissible at any
time.”87 In fact, a cancellation of any trademark contrary to the
section 2(a), (b), or (c) statutory bars can occur at any time; section
2(d) is the only limiting provision with respect to timing of petitions
for cancellation.88 A section 2(a) claim for false connection with a
person or institution and a section 2(d) claim for consumer
confusion appear to be synonymous in that they both have a
test for likelihood of confusion, thus creating what has been
called a “2(a) backdoor.” This procedural quirk is called a
backdoor because challengers can base a petition to cancel on a 2(a)
claim without having to worry about a mark’s incontestability (i.e.,
one may not challenge the likelihood of confusion of a mark
registered for over five years).89 Thus, a petitioner’s decision
between section 2(a) and 2(d) claims for cancellation of a
trademark registration may be more of a procedural ruse than a
substantive decision.90 Furthermore, this de facto five-year
statute of limitations is especially relevant for the petitioners in
Blackhorse, as their attempted use of the public interest exception
for a section 2(a) disparagement claim is supported largely by
exceptional cases involving section 2(d) claims in which the fiveyear rule was ignored for the benefit of a greater public interest.91
84 Lanham Act § 37; see 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 20:40; 5 MCCARTHY,
supra note 21, § 30:110.
85 Lanham Act § 37; 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 30:110.
86 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, at § 30:110.
87 Univ. of Notre Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imps. Co., 703 F.2d
1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1983). A petition for cancellation based on likelihood of confusion
(2(d)) is not permissible for registered marks after five years. Lanham Act § 14.
88 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 20:59.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 138 (D.D.C. 2003); UltraWhite Co., Inc. v. Johnson Chem. Indus., Inc., 465 F.2d 891, 893-94 (C.C.P.A. 1972);
Chun King Corp. v. Genii Plant Line, Inc., 403 F.2d 274, 276 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
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In the event that a party to a cancellation proceeding is
dissatisfied with the TTAB’s decision, the party may appeal under
section 21 of the Lanham Act.92 A party to an inter partes
cancellation proceeding in which there exists diversity of
citizenship (like Pro-Football in Blackhorse) has two options: (1)
appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,93 or (2)
pursue a remedy by civil action in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia.94 A petitioner’s decision to appeal to
the Federal Circuit, however, acts as a waiver of civil action and is
an alternative to de novo review by a federal district court.95
Furthermore, a petitioner’s decision to appeal to either the Federal
Circuit or a U.S. district court is dependent upon strategic
considerations.96 For instance, while the Federal Circuit route is an
appeal to a panel of three judges well versed in trademark law and
where no additional evidence is permitted, an appeal to a district
court allows for the introduction of new or additional evidence, thus
potentially broadening the scope of the case, but the proceeding is
heard by a single judge who is generally less experienced in
trademark law.97 Accordingly, district judges tend to be much more
deferential to TTAB rulings than are Federal Circuit panels.98 In
both Harjo and Blackhorse, Pro-Football decided to appeal to the
district court, but the statutory venue change may render the latter
proceeding’s outcome intriguingly uncertain.99
D.

Available Defenses in Cancellation Proceedings

In a trademark cancellation proceeding, a defendant
may look to section 33 of the Lanham Act for a number of

Lanham Act § 21.
Id. § 21(a).
94 Id. § 21(b). Technically, any federal district court that has personal jurisdiction
over the parties may review an inter partes decision by the TTAB. GARY D. KRUGMAN,
TRADEMARK TRIAL & APPEAL BOARD PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3:164 (2013-2014 ed.
2013). However, where there is diversity of citizenship between two parties, the Lanham Act
stipulates that the Eastern District of Virginia has exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. Id.
Since the passage of the AIA, the Lanham Act has been changed to reflect the venue change
from the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to the Eastern District of Virginia.
Lanham Act § 21.
95 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 21:10.
96 KRUGMAN, supra note 94, § 3:165.
97 Id.
98 Id. (“Most courts will give substantial deference to a Board decision and
will not disturb factual findings of the Board unless new evidence is introduced that
causes the court to have a thorough conviction that the Board erred.”).
99 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29, § 9, 125 Stat. 284,
316 (2011); Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 567 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2008); Pro-Football,
Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439 (E.D. Va. 2015); Complaint, Pro-Football, Inc. v.
Blackhorse, No. 1:14CV01043-GBL-IDD, 2014 WL 4719977 (E.D. Va. Aug 14, 2014).
92

93
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defenses.100 Section 33(a) offers an evidentiary defense in which a
trademark registered with the USPTO is prima facie evidence of
validity.101 Section 33(b) provides additional defenses, including
unclean hands, fraud, violation of First Amendment rights,
functionality, and various equitable defenses.102 For the equitable
defenses of estoppel, laches, and acquiescence, the Lanham Act
gives courts the power to award profits and damages based on
a balancing of private and public equities.103 Furthermore, in
trademark opposition and cancellation proceedings, laches and
equitable estoppel are both defenses tied to registration—not
use—of a mark.104 The rationale behind this requirement is that
the exclusive rights granted to a federal registrant motivate an
opposition or cancellation proceeding.105 Thus, if the laches
defense were tied to use of a mark, a trademark owner would
have to preemptively file suit against anyone using “a
possibl[y] conflicting mark or suffer . . . being barred by the
passage of time.”106
1. The Equitable Defense of Laches
Laches is an equitable defense that asks a court to
prevent granting relief to a claimant where the claimant has
unreasonably delayed in bringing the claim and where the delay
was consequently prejudicial to the defendant.107 The defense of
laches in trademark cancellation proceedings has proven effective
under certain circumstances, since unreasonable delay in
bringing a cancellation proceeding may have the effect of
harming a trademark owner who has invested time and money in
a mark.108 In general, a defense based on laches in a trademark
cancellation proceeding requires a showing that (1) the plaintiff
had knowledge of the trademark, (2) the plaintiff “inexcusably
delayed in taking [the] action,” and (3) the defendant will be
prejudiced by allowing the plaintiff to proceed.109 Estoppel by
Lanham Act § 33, 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (2012).
Id. § 33(a).
102 Id. § 33(b).
103 Id. §§ 34-35; 6 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 31:1.
104 Lincoln Logs Ltd. v. Lincoln Pre-Cut Log Homes, Inc., 971 F.2d 732, 734
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing In re Wella, A.G., 787 F.2d 1549, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1986)); 87
C.J.S. Trademarks § 235 (2015).
105 Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n v. Am. Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d 1572,
1581 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
106 Id. at 1581-82.
107 Laches, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
108 6 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 31:37.
109 Cuban Cigar Brands N.V. v. Upmann Int’l, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 1090, 1096
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
100

101
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laches can also be thought of as a formula, where the length of
delay multiplied by the amount of prejudice equates to estoppel.110
This creates a sliding scale, where if delay is determined to be
small but prejudice is great (and vice versa), estoppel by laches
may be a valid defense.111
Undue delay in a cancellation proceeding is present
when a party fails to bring an action but “knew or should have
known that it had a right of action.”112 There is no specific
amount of delay that has been considered unreasonable for the
purposes of estoppel by laches, as determinations of delay and
prejudice are largely fact-specific.113 While the former Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals has held that a delay of six
months or less will never result in sufficient prejudice for
estoppel by laches,114 courts have been less certain in instances
of longer delay.115 For example, while the D.C. Circuit ruled in
Harjo that a delay of less than eight years was significant
enough to cause undue prejudice, a plaintiff’s action after a
delay of 17 years in Loma Linda Food Co. v. Thomson & Taylor
Spice Co. was not barred by the laches defense.116
A defendant’s showing of prejudice is crucial to a laches
defense in cancellation proceedings, especially in a business
setting.117 The Federal Circuit in Bridgestone v. Automobile
Club explained that there are two main types of prejudice
stemming from unreasonable delay: (1) “prejudice . . . due to loss
of evidence or [faded] memory of witnesses” and (2) economic
prejudice based on opportunity cost.118 Also, the D.C. District
Court in Harjo determined that prejudice can be measured in
terms of opportunity cost, where past investment in a business’s
trademarks could have been allocated to different business
functions had the petitioner not slept on its rights.119 In Harjo, ProFootball effectively utilized the quintessential laches defense—that
6 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 31:2.
Id.
112 Bridgestone/Firestone Research, Inc. v. Auto. Club De L’Ouest De La
France, 245 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
113 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 20:76.
114 Ralston Purina Co. v. Midwest Cordage Co., 373 F.2d 1015, 1019 (C.C.P.A.
1967).
115 See George L. Blum, Application of the Defense of Laches in Action to
Cancel Trademark, 64 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 255, §§ 4-11 (2012) (offering a plethora of cases
featuring a range of delays in which relief was either barred or not barred by the
defense of laches).
116 Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 565 F.3d 880, 885 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Loma Linda
Food Co. v. Thomson & Taylor Spice Co., 279 F.2d 522, 524-26 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
117 6 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 31:12.
118 Bridgestone/Firestone Research, Inc. v. Auto. Club De L’Ouest De La
France, 245 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
119 Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 143 (D.D.C. 2003).
110
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where “plaintiff’s long failure to exercise its legal rights has caused
defendant to rely to its detriment by building up a valuable
business around its trademark,” then laches is a solid defense.120
Although section 14(3) permits a petition for cancellation
of a registered mark “at any time” where the registration is
contrary to the regulations set forth in sections 2(a), (b), or (c),121
in Harjo, the D.C. Circuit ruled that the language in section
14(3) did not prevent the application of a laches defense.122
According to the court, “[t]he words ‘[a]t any time’ demonstrate
only that the act imposes no statute of limitations for bringing
petitions.”123 Prior to the Federal Circuit’s 1991 decision in
National Cable Television Ass’n, Inc. v. American Cinema
Editors, Inc., the TTAB followed the rule that, in a cancellation
proceeding, delay for the purposes of the determination of laches
could be measured from a petitioner’s knowledge of the trademark
holder’s use of the mark.124 The National Cable court altered
the standard, however, determining that the old rule would
require a trademark owner to “bring [a] suit to stop use upon
learning of a possible conflicting mark or suffer the possibility of
being barred by the passage of time.”125 The current standard,
which stipulates that time begins to run upon knowledge of the
“registration of [a] mark,” is logical because only upon registration
of a mark does the holder obtain the rights against which a
cancellation petition could be made.126
2. The Public Interest Exception to the Defense of
Laches
The laches defense in a trademark cancellation proceeding
is subject to judicial and statutory limitations. For example, a
defendant may not claim estoppel by laches where the registered
mark is a generic term, there is fraud in registering the trademark,
or the trademark is abandoned.127 Additionally, according to the
6 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 31:12; Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 136-37.
Lanham Act § 14(3), 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2012). The exception to this, as
mentioned in Section I.C, supra, arises where a petitioner’s cancellation proceeding is
based on 2(d) grounds for likelihood of confusion, where a petition for cancellation is
only acceptable within five years of the registration of the mark at issue. 3 MCCARTHY,
supra note 21, § 20:59.
122 Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 415 F.3d 44, 48 (D.C. Cir. 2005); 3 MCCARTHY,
supra note 21, § 20:74.
123 Pro-Football, 415 F.3d at 48.
124 Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n, Inc. v. Am. Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d
1572, 1580-82 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
125 Id. at 1582.
126 Id. (emphasis added).
127 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 20:77.
120

121
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doctrine of progressive encroachment, a defendant may not claim
estoppel by laches where there has been insufficient time for
likelihood of confusion to harm the defendant’s mark.128
Furthermore, laches is not a defense where confusion between the
parties’ marks is inevitable, regardless of how long the delay or
how prejudiced the defendant may be.129 In cases of inevitable
confusion, the public’s interest “in being protected against the
continuing use of clearly confusing marks” is said to outweigh
the private prejudice felt by the trademark holder due to the
unreasonable delay and/or prejudice.130 Yet in a TTAB or
federal court proceeding, that confusion is “likely” but not
“inevitable” may still permit a laches defense.131 This public
interest exception to the defense of laches sometimes applies to
certification marks,132 where the public would be harmed if not
for assurance that proper standards for goods are being met.133
Also, in Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Leupold & Stephens Inc., the
TTAB illustrated that in instances of fraud in registering a
mark, the public interest precludes a defense of laches.134 In
Bausch & Lomb, the applicant was charged with fraud in
registering its ornamental mark and attempted to assert a
prior registration defense (similar to a laches defense).135 The
court reasoned that the public interest exception negated the
applicant’s defense because the public benefits from the
prevention of fraudulent registrations.136
Much to the chagrin of the Harjo petitioners, the D.C.
District Court ultimately declined to expand the public interest
exception to apply to section 2(a) disparagement claims.137
Harjo and Blackhorse both attempted to argue that there was an
overriding public policy that prevented scandalous or disparaging
marks from being registered, and thus no private interest could

Id.
Id.
130 6 id. § 31:10.
131 3 id. § 20:77.
132 A certification mark is a name, symbol, or device used in connection with
products or services to certify a defining characteristic of the goods or services (e.g.,
Underwriters Laboratories). 1 id. § 4:15.
133 Midwest Plastic Fabricators Inc. v. Underwriters Labs. Inc., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d
1067, 1987 WL 123860, at *2 (T.T.A.B. 1987) (“[T]he defense of laches is not available
where the petition to cancel is based on a claim that the respondent failed to control
the use of a certification mark, such that the mark is being used to certify goods that do
not meet specified standards.”).
134 See Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Leupold & Stephens Inc., 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1497,
1986 WL 83320, at *3 (T.T.A.B. 1986).
135 Id. at *1.
136 Id. at *3.
137 Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 138-39 (D.D.C. 2003).
128
129

1734

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:4

outweigh a public harm.138 Although the Harjo petitioners were
successful at the TTAB hearing stage, the district and circuit
courts agreed that the broad public interest exception found in
section 2(d) consumer confusion cases could not be applied to the
section 2(a) disparagement claims, as “such an interpretation
stretches the words of the Federal Circuit.”139 Furthermore, the
district court held that unlike section 2(d) claims that work to
protect a “strong public interest in avoiding deception or mistake,”
the public interest in section 2(a) claims for disparagement is
“somewhat more narrowly defined . . . because it applies to a more
narrow segment of the general population than in the likelihood
of confusion cases.”140 The petitioners have interpreted the district
court’s analysis as vague and weak, but dispatching a strong
laches defense for a watery exception in the greater public
interest is arguably less compelling.
II.

AVOIDING INCONSISTENCY WITH A BLANK SLATE IN THE
FOURTH CIRCUIT

Although there is a dearth of case law discussing section
2(a) grounds for trademark cancellation and corresponding laches
defenses,141 the Harjo proceedings have provided useful
precedent.142 When the Blackhorse court ordered a pretrial
conference in March 2011, the Administrative Trademark Judge
of the TTAB instructed the petitioner and respondent that the
law applicable to the proceeding’s key issues (laches and
disparagement) was established in the Harjo proceedings.143 As a
result, the disparagement and laches standards set in Harjo were
deemed controlling for purposes of the Blackhorse proceedings
because the Blackhorse “proceeding mirrors prior litigation before
138 Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1080, 2014 WL 2757516,
at *30 (T.T.A.B. 2014); Harjo v. Pro Football Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1828, 1994 WL
262249, at *3-5 (T.T.A.B. 1994).
139 Pro-Football, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 137.
140 Id. at 138.
141 See Latterell, supra note 48, at 1151 (indicating that, due to the lack of
developed case law surrounding 2(a) grounds for cancellation, case law involving claims
grounded in 2(d) are crucial for purposes of comparison). Additionally, case law
involving 2(d) claims was instrumental in the D.C. district court’s holding on the
defense of laches, as was the 2(d) cases’ examination of the public interest exception.
Pro-Football, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 137-38 (citing Ultra-White Co. v. Johnson Chem.
Indus., Inc., 465 F.2d 891, 893-94 (C.C.P.A. 1972); Chun King Corp. v. Genii Plant
Line, Inc., 403 F.2d 274, 276 (C.C.P.A. 1968)).
142 See, e.g., Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 567 F. Supp. 2d 46, 53-62 (D.D.C.
2008) (discussing Pro-Football’s strong argument for a defense of laches, considering
how long their marks have been registered and how long the petitioners took to
petition for cancellation).
143 Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., Cancellation No. 92046185, 2011 WL
1131509 (Mar. 15, 2011).
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the Board of a disparagement claim under Section 2(a).”144 The
2014 Blackhorse court reiterated the similarities between the two
proceedings and stated that “[b]ecause . . . this cancellation
proceeding is essentially a relitigation of what transpired in the
Harjo case before the Board, [the TTAB] will follow the precedent
of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.”145
In the 2003 Harjo hearing, the D.C. District Court
reversed the TTAB decision, holding that the public interest
exception precluded the application of the laches defense.146
Although, as critics of the majority rule have argued, the
district court’s decision (and the D.C. Circuit’s affirmation) that
the public interest in section 2(a) disparagement claims is
narrower than the public interest in section 2(d) likelihood of
confusion claims is a conclusion made “without citing any
precedent” and without an in-depth explanation, the decision
nonetheless served as binding precedent for the purposes of
future similar issues before the TTAB.147 According to the
TTAB Manual of Procedure, “To the extent that a civil action in a
federal district court involves issues in common with those in a
proceeding before the Board, the decision of the federal district
court is often binding upon the Board, while the decision of the
Board is not binding upon the court.”148
A.

The AIA’s Impact on Trademark Cancellation
Proceedings

Despite the application of the D.C. Circuit’s precedent in
the March and May 2011 orders,149 the 2014 TTAB nevertheless
felt that ancillary circumstances required it to ignore the D.C.
Circuit’s precedent and revisit the issue of laches as applied to the
section 2(a) disparagement claims.150 During the pendency of the
Blackhorse cancellation proceedings, Congress passed the AIA,
which represented the most significant change to patent law since

144 Id. at *1 (citing Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d. 1705, 1999 WL
375907 (T.T.A.B. 1999)).
145 Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1080, 2014 WL 2757516,
at *30 (T.T.A.B. 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting T.T.A.B., BOARD’S ORDER 12 n.6
(May 31, 2011)).
146 Pro-Football, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 136-38, aff’d, Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 565
F.3d 880 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
147 Latterell, supra note 48, at 1161.
148 TRADEMARK TRIAL & APPEAL BD., MANUAL OF PROCEDURE 510.02(a) (2014).
149 See Blackhorse v. Pro Football, Inc., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d 1633, 2011 WL
1886402, at *5 (T.T.A.B. 2011).
150 Blackhorse, 111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1080, 2014 WL 2757516, at *30.
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1952.151 Additionally, the AIA made changes affecting trademark
cancellation proceedings and the USPTO in general. Section 9, for
example, amended several Lanham Act provisions regarding
venue requirements.152 Specifically, the AIA amendments struck
“United States District Court for the District of Columbia” from
each place it appeared in the Lanham Act and inserted “United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia” in its
stead.153 Because the AIA became effective on September 16,
2011, and Pro-Football filed its appeal by civil action on August
14, 2014, these venue changes applied to the Blackhorse
proceedings, sending Pro-Football’s appeal of the TTAB decision
to the Eastern District of Virginia.154
While there is not a wealth of information explaining the
reasoning behind this amendment, according to the legislative
history of the AIA, the venue was changed mainly due to the
location of the USPTO’s headquarters.155 As applied to the
Blackhorse proceedings, the passage of the AIA meant that the
Eastern District of Virginia replaced the D.C. Circuit as the venue
for civil appeals under section 21(b) of the Lanham Act.156
Moreover, any decision to file a civil action appealing a TTAB
cancellation petition must now begin in the Eastern District of
Virginia. Although seemingly inconsequential in the grand
scheme of the AIA, this change in venue was significant to the
disposition of the Blackhorse proceedings and future cancellation
151 The AIA led to advancements in patent law, among other changes,
bringing the American system in line with the majority of the world by establishing a
first-to-file system. See Hung H. Bui, An Overview of Patent Reform Act of 2011:
Navigating the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act Including Effective Dates for Patent
Reform, 93 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 441, 445 (2011); see Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act, Pub L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
152 America Invents Act § 9.
153 Id.
154 Complaint, Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, No. 1:14CV01043-GBL-IDD,
2014 WL 4719977 (E.D. Va. Aug. 14, 2014); see EDWARD D. MANZO, AMERICA INVENTS
ACT: A GUIDE TO PATENT LITIGATION AND PATENT PROCEDURE § 11:4 (2015).
155 Legislative history indicates that the venue was changed mainly due to the
fact that the USPTO is now headquartered in the Eastern District of Virginia. PATRICK
A. DOODY, PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN, COMPREHENSIVE LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LEAHY-SMITH AMERICA INVENTS ACT 165 (2012). Moreover, section 1 of
Title 35 of the U.S. Code, which codifies the federal standards for the establishment of
the USPTO, stipulates that the USPTO “shall be deemed, for purposes of venue in civil
actions, to be a resident of the district in which its principal office is located.” 35 U.S.C.
§ 1(b) (2012). As the leading rationale acknowledges, “[l]eaving venue in the District
Court for the District of Columbia burdened that court unnecessarily.” MANZO, supra
note 154, § 11:1. The USPTO moved to its current Alexandria, Virginia, headquarters
(within the Eastern District of Virginia) in 2005, after spending nearly 40 years in its
Crystal City, Virginia, headquarters (within the U.S. District for the District of
Columbia). Public Release, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, USPTO’s Move to Alexandria,
Virginia, Is Ahead of Schedule, but Some Key Issues Need to Be Resolved, Final
Inspection Report (Sept. 2004).
156 Lanham Act § 21(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b) (2012); America Invents Act § 9.
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proceedings due to the Eastern District of Virginia’s reputation as
an expeditious forum and its virtually blank slate of precedent
concerning section 2(a) claims.157
1. Concerns Related to Introducing Section 2(a) of the
Lanham Act to the Rocket Docket
The Eastern District of Virginia was one of the first
federal districts deemed to have a “rocket docket,” earning and
embracing the motto, “Justice Delayed, Justice Denied.”158 In
rocket docket jurisdictions, judges use various “fast track”
techniques to minimize extensions and general delay.159 Some of
the tactics that the Eastern District of Virginia employs include
requiring judges to establish firm trial dates, permitting only
“good cause” exceptions to depart from scheduled trial dates, and
informing attorneys that the court discourages continuance
requests.160 The Eastern District of Virginia has been recognized
as a rocket docket jurisdiction since the 1960s and, as a result,
has managed to avoid the “litigation ‘crisis’” that confronted many
federal courts for decades during the second half of the twentieth
century.161 Rocket dockets ensure a truly speedy trial, minimizing
the time between filing and resolution, reducing litigation costs,
and enhancing procedural justice.162
Rocket dockets may not always lead to beneficial
outcomes, however, as a speedier proceeding can cause attorneys
to overlook important factors, lead to procedural injustices due to
coerced settlements, and force courts to compromise truth due to
a lack of time for a comprehensive review of the case on its
merits.163 Additionally, plaintiffs may have an edge in litigation,
as they are able to strategize ahead of time, while defendants

157 See Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1080, 2014 WL
2757516, at *32 (T.T.A.B. 2014); Carrie E. Johnson, Rocket Dockets: Reducing Delay in
Federal Civil Litigation, 85 CAL. L. REV. 225, 233 (1997).
158 William C. Rooklidge & Alison G. Barker, Reform of a Fast-Moving Target:
The Development of Patent Law Since the 2004 National Academies Report, 91 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 153, 180 (2009).
159 Johnson, supra note 157, at 233.
160 Id.
161 Kim Dayton, Case Management in the Eastern District of Virginia, 26
U.S.F. L. REV. 445, 450 (1992).
162 Johnson, supra note 157, at 243, 246 (“Rocket dockets, by limiting trial
preparation, can help prevent more resourceful parties from ‘bury[ing] opponents in
blizzards of pre-trial briefs.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Paul M. Barrett, “Rocket
Docket”: Federal Courts in Virginia Dispense Speedy Justice, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 1987,
at 29)).
163 Id. at 244-54 (“Too much speed reduces reliability, so produces less just
outcomes.”).
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must handle the expedited timeline on the fly.164 For example,
when Pro-Football filed its civil complaint appealing the TTAB
decision on August 14, 2014, its lawyers regarded the rocket
docket as an advantage, considering that the Harjo proceeding
took almost 11 years to advance through the much slower D.C.
Circuit, contributing to growing public disdain and strain on the
image of Pro-Football and the Washington Redskins professional
football team.165
The “speedy trial” features of the Eastern District of
Virginia had additional consequences for the Blackhorse
proceedings, specifically with regards to the introduction of
evidence.166 Per TTAB rules, an appeal by way of civil action
through the Eastern District of Virginia permits the introduction
of new evidence to the record, as opposed to the Federal Circuit’s
review of only the evidentiary record before the TTAB.167 As with
any case analyzing a disparagement claim, the Harjo cancellation
proceedings were largely dependent on the evidence provided
throughout regarding the “meaning of the matter in question”
and the marks’ impact on the group of petitioners.168 In theory,
then, the opportunity to introduce new evidence should have
helped Pro-Football’s case. The rocket docket cuts both ways,
however, as petitioners may not have had as much time to find,
collect, and prepare new evidence for hearings. Moreover,
although the rocket docket is theoretically designed to streamline
discovery, the expedited timeline can cause parties to overlook
evidence they might have otherwise found.169
2. The Fourth Circuit and a Clean Slate
Adding to the concerns associated with the rocket
docket, once appealed, civil actions brought in the Eastern
164 Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Reconceiving the Patent Rocket Docket: An
Empirical Study of Infringement Litigation 1985-2010, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 58, 63 (2011).
165 Complaint, Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, No. 1:14CV01043-GBL-IDD,
2014 WL 4719977 (E.D. Va. Aug. 14, 2014); Ian Simpson, Redskins’ Lawyer Sees
Quicker Resolution of Trademarks Case, REUTERS (June 19, 2014, 12:50 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/19/us-nfl-redskins-trademark-idUSKBN0EU1
IX20140619 [http://perma.cc/B4KQ-BGGN].
166 See Johnson, supra note 157, at 240-42 (discussing some rationales behind
the speedy resolution of cases in rocket dockets). Rocket dockets’ firm trial dates and
propensity to accelerate case resolution force parties, such as Pro-Football and Blackhorse,
to expedite the gathering of evidence and all procedural steps along the way. Id.
167 KRUGMAN, supra note 94, § 3:165.
168 See generally Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2003)
(reversing the TTAB’s analysis of the disparagement evidence). See supra note 74 and
accompanying text.
169 Johnson, supra note 157, at 244-45.
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District of Virginia are ultimately heard in the Fourth Circuit—a
court with little experience handling disparagement claims.170 The
lack of Fourth Circuit case law discussing section 2(a)
disparagement claims and the laches defense is a significant
concern as a result of the AIA’s venue change.171 In Blackhorse,
the TTAB referenced the Fourth Circuit’s lack of precedent,
claiming that “the passage of the [AIA] sufficiently changes the
circumstances in this case so as to justify revisiting the issue.”172
Taking advantage of these changed “circumstances” and
eschewing precedent set by the D.C. Circuit in Harjo, the 2014
TTAB replicated the 1999 TTAB ruling and held that the laches
defense does not apply to section 2(a) disparagement claims
where there exists a greater public interest.173 Specifically, the
2014 TTAB mirrored the 1999 TTAB when it stated that “[i]t is
difficult to justify a balancing of equities where a registrant’s
financial interest is weighed against human dignity.”174
Consequently, because Pro-Football elected to appeal via
civil action in the Eastern District of Virginia pursuant to the
recently amended section 21(b) of the Lanham Act, the Fourth
Circuit has the opportunity, just as the D.C. Circuit did in Harjo,
to set the standard for the defense of laches in section 2(a)
disparagement claims. As indicated by the TTAB in its 2014
Blackhorse opinion, the Fourth Circuit has yet to address
“whether laches applies to a claim that a term disparages a
substantial composite of an ethnic or cultural group.”175 Similar to
the D.C. Circuit, however, the Fourth Circuit has decided some
cases involving grounds for trademark infringement due to
likelihood of confusion.176 Perhaps unsurprisingly, Blackhorse has
attempted to utilize an argument similar to Harjo’s at the TTAB
stage, likening the section 2(a) disparagement claims to the
holdings in past cancellation proceedings in the Fourth Circuit
on section 2(d) grounds of likelihood of confusion.177 This
170 Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1080, 2014 WL 2757516,
at *32 (T.T.A.B. 2014).
171 Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1080, 2014 WL 2757516,
at *32 (T.T.A.B. 2014).
172 Id. at *30.
173 Id. at *31-32.
174 Id. at *31.
175 Id. at *32.
176 See, e.g., Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 799,
804 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that where an injunction is necessary, the doctrine of
laches cannot be used to block injunctive relief if further infringement is likely to cause
confusion); Resorts of Pinehurst, Inc. v. Pinehurst Nat’l Corp., 148 F.3d 417, 422-24 (4th Cir.
1998) (explaining that evidence of actual confusion supersedes a defense of laches); Sara Lee
Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 461-68 (4th Cir. 1996) (upholding the principle that
strong proof of likelihood of confusion negates the defense of laches).
177 Blackhorse, 111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1080, 2014 WL 2757516, at *32-33.
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provided Blackhorse the opportunity to raise the public interest
exception in an attempt to defeat the laches defense.178 But
further evaluation of Fourth Circuit cancellation proceedings
based on section 2(d) grounds reveals that the TTAB’s repetitious
advocacy for the public interest exception to the laches defense yet
again is fallible.
B.

The Public Interest Exception and the Fourth Circuit’s
Impending Choice

Like the district court’s analysis in Harjo,179 which
received criticism from Harjo for its vagaries, the Eastern District
of Virginia’s analysis of how the public interest exception applies
to the defense of laches gave the matter short shrift.180 Judge Lee
broadly stated that the public interest can weigh against the
application of the defense of laches and loosely indicated that
Blackhorse demonstrated “that the application of laches should be
barred because of the public’s interest in being free from
encountering registered marks that ‘may disparage.’”181 While we
cannot definitively predict how the Fourth Circuit will decide
the current dispute, we can look for insight into the specifics of
the Harjo dispute, the TTAB’s reasoning in the Blackhorse
petition, and existing section 2(d) trademark cancellation
proceedings with similar issues and rule of law applications.182
1. The Shortcomings of Section 2(d) Likelihood of
Confusion Cases in the Fourth Circuit
Consistent with the majority of federal circuits, the
Eastern District of Virginia has very little case law discussing
the merits of section 2(a) claims and the laches defense.183 But
as the TTAB noted in both Blackhorse and Harjo, evaluating
Fourth Circuit rulings on section 2(d) likelihood of confusion
Id.
Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 138-39 (D.D.C. 2003).
180 Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 489 (E.D. Va. 2015).
181 Id.
182 See, e.g., Bridgestone/Firestone Research, Inc. v. Auto. Club De L’Ouest De
La France, 245 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that the trademark holder could
avail itself of a laches defense, despite potential harm to the greater public interest);
Pro-Football, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96 (reversing the TTAB’s decision that the laches defense
was barred by the public interest exception); Blackhorse, 111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1080, 2014
WL 2757516 (holding that the public interest negates the defense of laches, as the
balancing of equities in a laches analysis is difficult to justify when comparing financial
interests with human dignity).
183 See Blackhorse, 111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1080, 2014 WL 2757516, at *32 (“[T]he
Fourth Circuit has not addressed whether laches applies to a claim that a term
disparages a substantial composite of an ethnic or cultural group . . . .”).
178
179
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claims may provide an appropriate comparison by analogy.184 This
comparison is most importantly based on notions of consumer
confusion or the greater public interest.185 As cancellation
petitions based on section 2(d) are asserted to prevent likely
confusion to the public, there is naturally an associated concern
for the general public interest.186 Furthermore, a mark that leads
to inevitable confusion poses an even greater harm to the public.187
Thus, it follows that where there exists inevitable confusion, the
defense of laches should not be applicable, since the public
interest weighs against preventing a challenge to an inevitably
confusing mark just because of unreasonable delay.188 Moreover,
because one of the foundational rationales of trademark law is
consumer protection, the public interest exception to the defense
of laches in section 2(d) claims is important to upholding
trademark law’s fundamental ideals.189
Because there is no Fourth Circuit case law discussing
section 2(a) disparagement claims, the Blackhorse petitioners—
and, in agreement, the TTAB—have argued that this greater
public interest exception in section 2(d) claims should be applied
to the respondent’s defense of laches by way of analogy.190 In
Blackhorse, Judge Lee lent credence to this comparison when he
cited Resorts of Pinehurst, Inc. v. Pinehurst National Corp.—
where the court refused to apply a laches defense to a section
2(d) claim in favor of the public interest191—for his only source
of support on the matter of the public interest exception to
laches in a section 2(a) claim.192 In Blackhorse, the TTAB stated
that “courts and the Board have routinely held that where there
is a broader public policy concern at issue, the equitable defense of
laches does not apply.”193 The TTAB specifically referred to a
number of cases in which courts refused to allow the laches
defense where there was a greater public interest, including
Ultra-White Company, Inc. v. Johnson Chemical Industries,
184 See Pro-Football, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 137-38; Blackhorse, 111 U.S.P.Q.2d
1080, 2014 WL 2757516, at *31-32.
185 See Pro-Football, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 137-38.
186 Lanham Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012); Ultra-White Co., Inc. v.
Johnson Chem. Indus., 465 F.2d 891, 893-94 (C.C.P.A. 1972).
187 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 20:36.
188 Id.
189 See id. § 2:1.
190 Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1080, 2014 WL 2757516,
at *30-31 (T.T.A.B. 2014).
191 Resorts of Pinehurst, Inc. v. Pinehurst Nat’l Corp., 148 F.3d 417 (4th
Cir. 1998).
192 Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 489 (E.D. Va. 2015)
(citing Resorts of Pinehurst, 148 F.3d 417, 423 (4th Cir. 1998)).
193 Blackhorse, 111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1080, 2014 WL 2757516, at *31 (citing UltraWhite Co. v. Johnson Chem. Indus., Inc., 465 F.2d 891 (C.C.P.A. 1972)).
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Inc.194 In Ultra-White, the appellate court refused to allow the
laches defense in a trademark cancellation proceeding, despite
the defendant’s accumulation of over 12 years of goodwill, due to
the similarity of the challenged mark and the inevitable confusion
to the public.195
Because none of the TTAB’s or Fourth Circuit’s case law
focuses on section 2(a) disparagement claims, these courts have
attempted to draw analogies to cancellation proceedings with
section 2(d) likelihood of confusion claims. However, the D.C.
District Court in Harjo refused to draw such an analogy and
recognized that section 2(a) claims differ from 2(d) claims
“because [2(a) claims] appl[y] to a more narrow segment of the
general population than in the likelihood of confusion cases.”196
The TTAB in Blackhorse did make reference to a rare trademark
cancellation proceeding featuring a section 2(a) claim (for claims
of “false suggestion of a connection,” rather than disparagement)
in Bridgestone/Firestone Research, Inc. v. Automobile Club De
L’Ouest De La France.197 In Bridgestone, however, the Federal
Circuit said that the section 2(a) false suggestion provision is
“not designed primarily to protect the public,” but is instead
thought to highlight an individual’s right to privacy.198 The
Bridgestone court further outlines that the protection of the right
to privacy is what separates section 2(a) false suggestion of
connection claims from section 2(d) likelihood of confusion claims.199
While section 2(a) disparagement claims differ from section 2(a)
claims of false suggestion of connection, the underlying nodes of
privacy the Bridgestone court discusses persist through section 2(a)
and differentiate the section from section 2(d) likelihood of
confusion claims.200
The TTAB in Blackhorse failed to acknowledge that the
D.C. Circuit addressed this exact argument in the Harjo
proceedings and found that the public interest exception should
not be applied to section 2(a) disparagement claims.201 Therefore,
although the AIA has changed the venue for appeals to the
Fourth Circuit, the TTAB’s and Eastern District of Virginia’s
194 Id. (citing Ultra-White, 465 F.2d 891; Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Leupold &
Stevens Inc., 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1497, 1499 (T.T.A.B. 1986); Int’l Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, Inc. v.
H. Marvin Ginn Corp., 225 U.S.P.Q. 940, 947 (T.T.A.B. 1985); Midwest Plastic
Fabricators, Inc. v. Underwriters Labs., Inc., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1067, 1069 (T.T.A.B. 1987)).
195 Ultra-White, 465 F.2d at 893-94.
196 Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 138 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
197 Blackhorse, 2014 WL 2757516, at *31 (citing Bridgestone/Firestone
Research, Inc. v. Auto. Club De L’Ouest De La France, 245 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
198 Bridgestone, 245 F.3d at 1363.
199 Id. at 1363.
200 Id.
201 Pro-Football, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 137-38.
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decision to disregard the D.C. Circuit’s holding in Harjo in
what is “essentially a relitigation of what transpired in the
Harjo case” is perplexing.202 The TTAB’s approach was reversed
by the D.C. District and Circuit Courts in the Harjo litigation,
prompting the question: What can be done to achieve consistency
and predictability between the D.C. Circuit and the Fourth
Circuit in analyses of cancellation proceedings for section 2(a)
claims of disparagement?
III.

A PROPOSED SOLUTION FOR CONSISTENCY AMONG
CIRCUIT COURTS

Pro-Football’s decision to file a civil complaint rather than
appealing to the Federal Circuit, coupled with the passage of the
AIA and its resultant appointment of the Eastern District of
Virginia as the district for TTAB cancellation appeals, has
afforded the Fourth Circuit the opportunity to set significant
precedent and maintain consistency across circuits.203 To ensure
this consistency, the Fourth Circuit should reject the Eastern
District of Virginia’s decision in favor of the public interest
exception to the defense of laches and revive the laches defense
in similar section 2(a) disparagement claims. Considering the
lack of precedent involving section 2(a) disparagement claims
and the Fourth Circuit’s new appellate jurisdiction over trademark
cancellation proceedings, the Fourth Circuit should disallow the
application of the public interest exception to the laches defense.
When a party appeals a TTAB ruling in a trademark
cancellation proceeding, the decision between de novo review by
the Federal Circuit and a civil action in district court is
potentially crucial to the pendency and disposition of the case.204
It is significant that only the civil action route allows for the
introduction of new evidence, especially in a trademark
cancellation proceeding in which there are factually dependent
claims of disparagement and prejudice for the purposes of the
laches defense.205 Accordingly, new evidence unavailable or
undiscovered at the TTAB stage and introduced in a civil action in
the district court may provide a plaintiff with a persuasive
argument to overturn an adverse TTAB ruling on the same
issue.206 In the current Blackhorse proceeding, Pro-Football was
unsuccessful in defending its trademark registrations in the
202
203
204
205
206

Blackhorse, 111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1080, 2014 WL 2757516, at *30-31.
See id.; Pro-Football, Inc. v. Marjo, 565 F.3d 880, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
KRUGMAN, supra note 94, § 3:165.
Id.
See id.
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TTAB hearing, but a change in venue may lead to a favorable
outcome for Pro-Football, as well as any party hoping to raise the
laches defense in a section 2(a) cancellation proceeding.
Above all, the Fourth Circuit’s decision on just how
deferential it plans to be to the Eastern District of Virginia’s ruling
in favor of applying the public interest exception to the defense of
laches in section 2(a) claims will determine the finality of the
Blackhorse cancellation proceeding—the first major disparagement
dispute in the Fourth Circuit—and set a precedent for similar
proceedings in the future. One may expect the Fourth Circuit
to defer to the Eastern District of Virginia and the TTAB’s
holdings, considering the Fourth Circuit’s inexperience with
cancellation proceedings and the limited available precedent.
The Eastern District of Virginia’s decision to uphold the TTAB’s
decision is not surprising, since “[m]ost courts will give substantial
deference to a board decision and will not disturb factual findings
of the Board unless new evidence is introduced that causes the
court to have a thorough conviction that the Board erred.”207 This is
likely due to the fact that the TTAB examines the initial evidence,
holds hearings, and has decades of experience offering
administrative oversight in trademark cancellation proceedings,
and the USPTO employs thousands of specialists for the sole
purpose of providing expertise on these topics.208
Although the Fourth Circuit’s standard of review in a
trademark case will likely be highly deferential with regards to
the Eastern District of Virginia’s findings of fact, the Fourth
Circuit is not required to defer to the district court’s application
or misapplication of the law.209 In fact, although an inexperienced
district court may be more deferential, “[t]he Federal Circuit has
no reticence reversing a Board decision when it believes that it is
appropriate to do so.”210 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit has the
opportunity to review the application of the public interest
exception to the defense of laches and the corresponding
governing law with a less deferential standard. Given this
flexibility, the Fourth Circuit has the opportunity to follow the
D.C. Circuit’s lead with regards to the public interest exception
to the defense of laches.
The public interest exception to a properly raised laches
defense to a section 2(a) cancellation claim, as is the case in the
Id.
KRUGMAN, supra note 94, § 3:165; About Us, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
http://www.uspto.gov/about/index.jsp [http://perma.cc/7ZYP-KGRG] (last visited Apr.
28, 2016).
209 Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 460 (4th Cir. 1996).
210 KRUGMAN, supra note 94, § 3:165.
207
208
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pending Blackhorse dispute before the Fourth Circuit, confuses
the purposes of trademark law. Furthermore, the Blackhorse
proceedings have perpetuated this confusion by drawing
comparisons to the public interest exception as it applies to the
defense of laches in section 2(d) claims of likelihood of confusion.211
Section 2(d) claims of likelihood of confusion target one of the
main purposes of trademark law (i.e., consumer protection), and
thus an exception to the equitable defense of laches for the
benefit of the greater public interest fits neatly in trademark
law jurisprudence.212 But where the public interest at issue
“applies to a more narrow segment of the general population
than in the likelihood of confusion cases,” application of the
exception leads to overprotection of consumers and overextension
of trademark law.213
Although the public interest is an important consideration
in trademark law, the TTAB and the Eastern District’s appeal to
the public interest in support of Blackhorse’s argument against a
laches defense is yet another example of courts straying from the
original intentions of trademark protection.214 As applied to
section 2(a) disparagement claims and the defense of laches, then,
the protection of a greater public interest arguably does not
further the protection of a trademark owner’s investment, nor
does it protect the consuming public from confusion or exorbitant
search costs.215 While not a per se expansion of trademark
protection, the decisions by the TTAB and the Eastern District of
Virginia simply represent a movement away from the original
intentions of trademark law.
CONCLUSION
The Fourth Circuit should set a precedent for civil appeals
from the TTAB’s decisions under the new AIA procedure and
assert that an exception based on a greater public interest is
inapplicable to the laches defense in section 2(a) trademark
cancellation disparagement claims. Faced with a nearly identical
claim by a different offended group of petitioners, the TTAB’s and
Eastern District’s defiance of the D.C. Circuit’s prior ruling in
Harjo has been misguided, and thus a consistent precedent
Blackhorse, 111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1080, 2014 WL 2757516, at *31-32.
1 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 2:1.
213 Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 138 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
214 See Deborah R. Gerhardt, Consumer Investment in Trademarks, 88 N.C. L.
REV. 427, 427-29 (2010).
215 See generally 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 2:1 (outlining the general
policy goals of trademark law, including the protection of the trademark owner’s
investment and protection of the consuming public from deceptive tactics).
211

212
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should be established so the Fourth Circuit can ensure efficiency
and monitor expectations for litigants in both the rocket docket
jurisdiction of the Eastern District of Virginia and the Fourth
Circuit. While a decision to permit raising the laches defense
would not necessarily have been dispositive in Harjo, as ProFootball would still be required to prove undue delay and
subsequent prejudice,216 the public interest exception has
preempted the mere opportunity to utilize the equitable doctrine.
Additionally, holding steady with the Harjo decision may
result in reverberations throughout various other professional
sports organizations. Aside from the Washington Redskins, other
sports organizations with established trademarks that have been
met with similar protest include the Atlanta Braves, Chicago
Blackhawks, and Cleveland Indians.217 Just as some of ProFootball’s trademark registrations were issued almost 50 years
ago, the Chicago Blackhawks’ “Blackhawks” mark in connection
with entertainment services in the nature of professional ice
hockey dates back to 1970.218 Similarly, the Cleveland Indians
and Atlanta Braves have registrations for their names in their
respective entertainment international classes dating back to
the mid-1980s.219 Accordingly, depending on the final outcome
of the Blackhorse appeals, these historic trademarks and their
accumulated investment and goodwill may similarly be subject to
section 2(a) disparagement challenges without the affirmative
defense of laches. Such organizations have had similar success
licensing their marks for use on various products, indicating a
need to take advantage of protections offered by trademark
law.220 Without a consistent ruling, there is a real possibility
that “a minority of hypothetically offended people [will] override
KRUGMAN, supra note 94, § 3:52.
Erik Brady, Redskins Not Only Team Targeted for Indian Nickname, USA
TODAY (May 5, 2014, 11:07 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/2014/05/04/redsk
ins-mascot-nickname-indians-wahoo-chiefs-blackhawks-braves/8705159/
[http://perma.
cc/YCH7-QPEJ]; Regina F. Graham, Racism of Sports Logos Put into Context by American
Indian Group, CBS CLEVELAND (Oct. 8, 2013, 11:59 PM), http://cleveland.cbslocal.com/20
13/10/08/racism-of-sports-logos-put-into-context-by-american-indian-group/ [http://perma.cc/
SA74-FLRE].
218 Pro-Football, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 104-07; BLACKHAWKS, Registration No.
0,893,052.
219 ATLANTA BRAVES, Registration No. 1,484,697; CLEVELAND INDIANS,
Registration No. 1,287,632.
220 According to Forbes, the Chicago Blackhawks are the fourth most valuable
team in the National Hockey League, valued at $925 million with a “brand” valued at $120
million. NHL Team Valuations, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/teams/chicago-blackhawks/
[http://perma.cc/K8E7-HNJR] (last visited Apr. 29, 2016). Similarly, the Atlanta Braves
were highly valued at $1,150 million, good for twelfth most valuable in Major League
Baseball, with a brand valued at $145 million. MLB Team Valuations, FORBES,
http://www.forbes.com/teams/atlanta-braves/ [http://perma.cc/YYL2-RYMB] (last visited
Apr. 29, 2016).
216
217
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community standards of taste” and discount the accumulation of
decades of goodwill and significant financial investment.221
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